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summary
Different sectors of society typically value, need and demand different
bundles of ecosystem services. At the same time, important trade-offs
exist between the production of different services, and it is not
possible to increase the resilience of all ecosystem services
simultaneously. Decisions about which services to sustain in a parti-
cular social–ecological system therefore require trade-offs that are
inherently political. Politics can be described as ‘the authoritative
allocation of values for a society’ (Easton 1965). To further complicate
matters, the desiredmix of services will evolve with changing societal
values and preferences, and the resilience of ecosystem services is only
one among many desired outcomes (e.g. equality, human rights,
democracy) of social–ecological systems. Resolving these trade-offs
requires resolution of collective-action dilemmas and intergroup
conﬂicts, a process that comes replete with power inequalities, asym-
metric resource bases and unequal outcomes. This chapter discusses
some of the asymmetries and power dynamics that underlie decisions
of which ecosystem services should form the focus for resilience
building initiatives; the remainder of the book assumes these choices
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have been made and focuses on how the resilience of some agreed-on
mix of ecosystem services may be enhanced. Here, we focus speciﬁ-
cally on the social consequences of trade-offs between ecosystem
services; asymmetries in the distribution of ecosystem services; and
we brieﬂy discuss the broad literature of how these may be addressed
through wider deliberative processes. We ﬁnd that issues associated
with the allocation of ecosystem services are poorly integrated into
the resilience literature, and suggest that an improved understanding
of allocation trade-offs could result frommore applied research on use
of ecosystem services that integrates perspectives from the social
sciences about how and why people make and respond to decisions
concerning ecosystem services.
2.1 introduction
Prompted by escalating rates of environmental change, resilience
thinking is one emerging applied ﬁeld that explicitly seeks to inform
managers and policy-makers in the governance of social–ecological
systems (SES) and the ecosystem services they produce (Berkes et al.
2000; Walker and Salt 2006). Much of this research has moved beyond
the dichotomous separation of social and ecological systems, toward
studying coupled or linked SES. It also moves away from traditional
top-down management approaches, premised on static or linear
notions of ecosystems and social organization. The research incorpo-
rates greater attention to the existence of multiple possible ecosystem
and social states or regimes, the possibility of rapid non-linear change,
linkages across and among scales, and the idea that different SES states
and their associated ecosystem services beneﬁt different groups of
people (Holling and Meffe 1996; MA 2005) (Chapter I).
This chapter analyses some of the important political and power
dimensions inherent in the governance of SES and the implicit or
explicit societal choices about which sets of ecosystem services to
build resilience of, and try to sustain, in the face of disturbance and
change. Any particular set of ecosystem services for which we
build resilience will involve trade-offs – both between actor groups
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and between different bundles of ecosystem services – with decisions
inﬂuenced (to a greater or lesser extent) by issues of power and
inequality. Blindly applying the principles put forward in this book
may accomplish some groups’ goals, but may also intensify
ecosystem-service trade-offs and power differentials. While these
issues are ubiquitous to the process of political decision-making,
this chapter seeks to highlight the political and power dimensions
that can inﬂuence the selection of speciﬁc sets of ecosystem services
to build resilience of, and to emphasize the need to reﬂect on these
issues before applying the principles put forward in this remainder of
this book.
In particular, we emphasize the inherent danger in ecosystem
governance approaches that do not incorporate and consider the social
mechanisms by which governance and institutions accomplish their
goals (Hatt 2012; Brown and Westaway 2011). Any set of ecosystem
services ‘chosen’ as the focus for resilience-building initiatives is an
emergent outcome resulting from both explicitly and implicitly
political processes. Too often, initiatives aimed at building resilience
do not consider the existing socio-political inequalities in the system,
and the extent to which strategies aimed at building resilience may
reinforce and aggravate these disparities and inequalities. This does
notmean that perfect equality is achievable, but rather that increasing
levels of inequalitymay reach dangerous levels. Scientists themselves
may contribute to the problem if an overly technocratic approach is
adopted and societal goals are not more widely deliberated. While
scientiﬁc analyses may provide valuable information about the
different magnitude and mix of ecosystem services that might be
provided by different SES states, this information does not necessarily
make clear what SES states and ecosystem services aremost desirable,
nor is the aim of scientiﬁc analysis to do so. Choosing to build
resilience of a particular set of ecosystem services reﬂects an implicit
valuation of a speciﬁc set of services by speciﬁc groups of people at
particular times and places, and either explicitly (or not) includes the
inherent trade-offs that accompany those choices. Consequently,
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Carpenter et al. (2001) caution that resilience of such a chosen set of
services is a ‘normative concept’ and Armitage and Johnson
(2006, p. 14) urge that consideration of resilience under such circum-
stances should be ‘situated in the context of contested and evolving
human interests and the uncertainties of human interaction.’
Ultimately, all initiatives aimed at building resilience of ecosystem
services have distributional implications, and are a matter of justice
within and between generations (Norgaard 2010).
Throughout the rest of the book, we focus on general principles
that might be employed to build resilience of different sets of ecosys-
tem services, and assume that some process has been followed to
arrive at the selected one. We do not deﬁne this ‘desired’ set of eco-
system services, as it will vary between places and groups, and change
over time as societal preferences change. Here, we emphasize the
critical necessity of reﬂecting on the implicit or explicit choice
about which ecosystem services to build resilience of before attempt-
ing to apply any of the principles. In thiswaywe ensure that initiatives
aimed at building such resilience of ecosystem services do not simply
advance and entrench the position ofmore powerful groups in society.
To do so, this chapter ﬁrst discusses some of the trade-offs between
ecosystem services implicit in building resilience for a given set of
ecosystem services. We then explore the challenges and repercussions
of distribution that result from these trade-offs. Finally, we highlight
some asymmetries and how these may be reduced to increase legiti-
macy in the selection of ecosystem services that can, in turn, provide
greater support for maintaining speciﬁc sets of ecosystem services.
2.2 the trade-offs of selecting between
bundles of ecosystem services
Different bundles of ecosystem services often trade off against one
another, and the selection of one bundlemay eliminate the possibility
for the production of other bundles of ecosystem services, as high-
lighted in Box 2.1 (MA 2005; Bennett et al. 2009) (Chapter 1). For
instance, the preservation of global biodiversity as a public good
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box 2.1 Ecosystem services and community-based
conservation in the Richtersveld National
Park, Southern Africa
Community-based conservation (CBC), promoting local participa-
tion and sustainable use of resources, arose in the 1990s as a response
to failures of top-down command and control approaches to conserva-
tion. Paralleling the discourse in this chapter, past conservation
efforts often reinforced deep power asymmetries of groups favouring
different bundles of ecosystem services. In the case of protected areas,
the global conservation movement led by international environmen-
tal NGOs and their supporters pushed for greater protection of
biodiversity at a global scale and, in support of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity of parks, advocated for ecotourism within the parks. However,
this collection of ecosystem services often came at the expense of
local resource users. While CBC should not be viewed as a panacea,
and local communities as a romanticized, homogeneous group in
sustainable balance with nature, we do see instances where broader
participation assuages some of the trade-offs of ecosystem services
identiﬁed in the chapter.
In |Ai-|Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Park, straddling the border of
Namibia and South Africa (Fig. 2.1), initial management followed
top-down conservation methods. Although Richtersveld National
Park in South Africa, created in 1991, arose out of the settlement of
land claims between the local community and the national govern-
ment and the creation of a contractual park, restrictions to local users
often meant closing access to grazing of sheep and goats as well as the
collection of other resources. In the words of the park manager, ‘tour-
ists won’t pay to see goats’ (personal communication, 2008). Once
again, biodiversity conservation goals and tourist expectations
trumped local ecosystem-service decisions. Yet this approach to con-
servation comes with well-known drawbacks. Resource restrictions
may compound poverty and worsen subsistence viability. For these
reasons as well as basic concepts of equality, it often lacks legitimacy
in the surrounding communities. In turn,monitoring and enforcement
of regulations and restrictions becomes difﬁcult, expensive and often
ineffective. Through the contractual park, in which the local commu-
nity owned the land and collaboratively managed the park with the
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(a)
(b)
fig. 2.1 (a) The Succulent Karoo ecosystem of |Ai-|Ais/Richtersveld
Transfrontier Park looks harsh but is home to high biodiversity
richness and a suite of ecosystem services. (b) The Orange or Gariep
River forms the international boundary between Namibia and South
Africa and forms a political divide in the ecosystem, separating |Ai-|Ais
Hot Springs from Richtersveld National Park. Photo credits: Christo
Fabricius
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advocated by predominantlyWestern environmental advocacy groups
through increasing the area of national parks andminimizing resource
extraction reduces the land available for subsistence use as arable land
or as a source of food, lodging or medicinal products (Robards et al.
2011). Similarly, the creation of palm-oil plantations to cater to the
global demand for oil products decreases the carbon sequestration
possibilities of old-growth tropical forests (Butler et al. 2009). In
such cases one set of ecosystem services reduces or obviates the
possibility of other sets, and a dilemma emerges in that different
groups of people beneﬁt from one selection as opposed to another.
These trade-offs can perpetuate the dispossession of lands and
resources initiated during the era of European colonialism, and further
the logic of enclosure in which resources formerly held in common
become privatized commodities (Heynen and Robbins 2005).
box 2.1 Continued
South African National Parks Board, the local Nama people and park
ofﬁcials began a deliberative process regarding access, use and
management of natural resources. As a result of this deliberation,
grazing was again allowed back in the park.
As community members became more involved in a conserva-
tion initiative of their own development, they became emboldened
and created Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape, a
community conservancy. In 2007, the conservancy was granted
UNESCO World Heritage status. World Heritage status was
granted with ‘the traditional land-use system of the Nama …
seen as part of the protection system’ (whc.unesco.org).
Speciﬁcally, the sustainable resource use of the transhumance
grazing practices and the traditional use of grass for portable
thatched roof housing were seen as integral elements to the
cultural landscape. In effect, deliberation with the park
service and self-determination put in place a series of events at
the time of this writing and a dramatic shift in resource rules from
strict restriction to increased access to a celebration of sustainable
resource use.
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The desired allocation or prioritization of ecosystem services at
one level or scale often has direct trade-offs and may be radically
opposed at another scale. For instance, the provision of wild meats
in tropical forests at a local level may be essential for communities,
but may be counter to global biodiversity goals; swidden (shifting
cultivation) agriculture may sustain local economic or nutritional
needs, but minimize global climate mitigation actions; and
laissez-faire planning and urban sprawl may beneﬁt local govern-
ments, but work against global goals for the reduction of fossil-fuel
consumption. Such trade-offs may be accentuated by differing
worldviews or cultures.
Because it is usually not possible to meet all societal needs and
expectations, we must acknowledge that any particular set of
ecosystem services involves trade-offs with other options. Usually
these trade-offs are biased in favour of particular groups, or can only
be mitigated through acknowledging the special interests of speciﬁc
groups in society. Examples include the mitigation of global
greenhouse-gas emissions by more powerful countries through
capture of forest resources in tropical low- and middle-income
countries, which may perpetuate poverty traps in which systemic
inﬂuences reinforce the root causes of poverty through the control of
resource access and use (Sachs 2005) or create them as a collateral
repercussion of not wishing to bear the economic burden of emission
reductions (Dow et al. 2006). In theseways, emission reduction efforts
may lead to poverty traps similar to those arising from some past
biodiversity conservation efforts (Adams et al. 2004), where access to
resources by local communities may be restricted, leading to further
impoverishment.
These examples demonstrate how trade-offs between ecosystem
services can have signiﬁcant social consequences. Selecting particular
sets of ecosystem services can result in a number of ramiﬁcations
that may reinforce the inequalities that led to those choices. In the
following section, we draw further attention to such distributional
questions that often arise from the trade-offs of ecosystem services.
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2.3 the challenges of distribution
Distributional challenges emerge when certain groups of people have
disproportionate and inequitable beneﬁts from the selection of
speciﬁc sets of ecosystem services. These beneﬁts are often linked to
the fact that those who beneﬁt from the ecosystem services may
institute rules, which give them access to these ecosystem services
while other groups are precluded. For example, a Kenyan coastal SES’s
restrictions on ﬁshing gear – speciﬁcally use of seine nets – aimed at
conserving the ﬁshery and building ecosystem resilience, have
important socially differentiated impacts. In particular, women ﬁsh
traders are disadvantaged as their access to small, cheap ﬁsh is
undermined, thus eroding their livelihood opportunities and negotiat-
ing capabilities in setting access rules to the ﬁshery (Daw et al. 2012).
Bundles of ecosystem services and related governing institu-
tions are often directly affected by, if not products of, historical
institutions relating to property rights, land-use decisions, and the
logic of appropriateness in resource use. Prior conditions and
constraints may maintain a strong inﬂuence on contemporary eco-
system services. As an example, among other policies aimed at redu-
cing pelagic sealing and more closely controlling the scale of early
twentieth-century trade in fur seals, the United States restricted
indigenous Unangan hunters from using modern technology in their
hunt for fur seals. This type of restriction, while originally based on
considerations of commerce as much as conservation eventually
constituted a major restriction in the name of conservation under
numerous international wildlife conventions including the North
Paciﬁc Fur Seal Convention of 1911 and the 1946 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Meek 2011).
Human preferences often prioritize provisioning services over
regulating services, and both of these are prioritized over cultural and
supporting services (Rodriguez et al. 2006). These choicesmay exacer-
bate societal inequalities, and not only between different social
groups; they also serve to privilege an immediate time horizon over
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a more sustainable long-term perspective, and current generations
over future generations. For instance, lasting soil conservation and
theminimization ofdongas (dried, erodedwaterways) through pasture
rotation and limits on livestock often lacks support amongst local
herders when they compare this to wealth maximization as measured
by herd size in parts of southern Africa (Doran et al. 1979). While
current generations may beneﬁt from the increased cattle numbers,
the loss of productive land can substantially reduce the potential of
future generations to make a living.
Scientists may further complicate distributional trade-offs
between societal groups by exerting power and inﬂuence through
scientization of a political problem, often unknowingly or uninten-
tionally using science to mask their own interests (Habermas 1970).
Scientization suppresses the open discussion of value preferences and
delegitimizes those without a scientiﬁc perspective to support their
position. This often marginalizes those unable to speak the specia-
lized language of science, which often includes the disenfranchised
who bear the brunt of the negative trade-offs (Gismondi and
Richardson 1991; Lemos 2003; Sarewitz 2004). In juxtapose, politici-
zation is when people – whether scientists, (non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), private industries or others –manipulate science to
ﬁt their desired political or legal interests (Joly et al. 2010). Politicians
are not the only actors who can politicize science, as scientists can
also use science to defend and pursue their own political interests
(Pielke 2004). Politicization can inhibit corrective feedbacks that
enable SES governance to respond to and incorporate different view-
points or new scientiﬁc understanding.
Promotion of certain sets of ecosystem services by more power-
ful sectors of society results in a number of ramiﬁcations that may
reinforce the inequalities that led to speciﬁc choices. These distribu-
tional disputes often result in strengthening the status quo. The
conclusion of work focusing on ecosystem-service trade-offs is the
need to ﬁnd a balance among services to accomplish the ‘greater
good’ (e.g. Nelson et al. 2009; Palumbi et al. 2009). However, this is
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no easy task. The following section discusses responses to emergent
asymmetries and means for alleviating them, potentially providing a
more legitimate and sustainable system.
2.4 responding to emergent asymmetries
At a landscape level, any initiatives to build resilience of ecosystem
services entails implicit trade-offs, because it necessarily needs to
privilege certain ecosystem services, and different groups of people
will beneﬁt to greater or lesser extents. As in many complex systems,
there is no optimal set of ecosystem services or real-world Pareto
frontier whereby no one can be made better off without someone
else beingworse off as a result (Levin 2002). Issues of equity and justice
can be balanced to varying degrees, but not optimized due to their
normative nature. The resultant discord between desired outcomes
and the speciﬁc combination of ecosystem services that are captured
by individuals, communities or society in general, will produce
asymmetric gaps as described by Lasswell and Kaplan (1950).
In prioritizing speciﬁc sets of ecosystem services, care must be
given to ensuring that society builds resilience to a fair and equitable set
of ecosystem services rather than entrenching the positions of a privi-
leged few – or risk both moral (e.g. human rights (Hardin 1998)) and
practical (e.g. revolution (Scott, 1998, 2009)) repercussions. Institutions
that remove people’s access to, or use of a speciﬁc service, need tomore
explicitly attend to what these people will do in response, and if they
have the capacity and agency to adapt to or buffer that scarcity. History
runs rife with examples of not attending to these questions. Although
the very construct of ecosystem services implies a substitutable
commodity rather than an outcome of contestation and historical
paths, at the same time it may allow considerable transparency in
evaluating trade-offs that might otherwise be taken for granted.
Onemeans of building amore legitimate and broadly acceptable
choice of ecosystem services is through broader deliberation. More
fully deliberating the ‘desirability’ of ecosystem services in SES may
not only balance competing conceptualizations of ‘desirability’, but
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can build further beneﬁts toward sustainability or resilience of
ecosystem services. It is here that long-standing philosophical debates
(e.g. Hobbes, Foucault, Habermas) can be drawn upon in a process of
social learning as well as the work of deliberative democracy scholars
(Dewey 1927; Rawls 1993; Dryzek 2002), as we collectively seek to
ﬁnd legitimate sustainable relationships with each other and the
world around us.
These ideas foreshadow our discussions on building resilience
through the principles of learning (P5 – Learning), broader levels of
participation (P6 – Participation) and innovative governance arrange-
ments such as polycentricity (P7 – Polycentricity). The notion that
participation leads to more resilient provision of ecosystem services
stems in part from increasing legitimacy of the political process of
selecting which ecosystem services to build resilience of. Increased
participation also results in more respected monitoring and enforce-
ment, as well as a means to change inequitable outcomes through
collective choice bargaining (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Similarly,
polycentric governance arrangements allow for learning and
experimentation across geographic governance regions as well as a
diversity of institutional options (Olsson et al. 2004).
2.5 the benefits of wider deliberation
Ecosystem-service governance outcomes are a result of balancing
competing ‘desires’ of different groups; however, they are inﬂuenced
by various asymmetries, leading some groups to get closer to their
desired goals than others. As we have shown, agency of those in
power to self-allocate the ﬂow of ecosystem services may lead them
maintaining their short-term beneﬁts and the status quo in terms of
inequalities and asymmetries.However, disenfranchisement of speciﬁc
actorsmay lead to humanitarian issues or revolt of the disenfranchised.
We have argued for the need to explicitly acknowledge trade-offs,
distributional issues, and the repercussions of not proactively incorpor-
ating the responses of, or repercussions to the disenfranchised – in other
words the need to consider appropriately the social ramiﬁcations of
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political decision-making when it comes to initiatives to build resili-
ence of ecosystem services. Examples of processes to guide such
thinking include companion modelling (Étienne 2011) or recent work
on mental models (Biggs et al. 2011) (P4 – CAS thinking).
Openly deliberative processes may better incorporate feedbacks
from the marginalized through providing for more inclusion, but will
require the more powerful to incorporate pluralistic local needs and
values into the dominant paradigms that they seek to maintain.
Acting in this manner is no simple matter; however, self-restraint
does emerge in governance. For example, constitutions favouring
equal opportunity of all citizens may limit a government’s ability to
provide preferential allocation of resources to speciﬁc groups or com-
munities. Establishing the degree to which global desires are being
achieved at the cost of local repercussions will better illuminate
priorities for action. Numerous authors have indicated that biodiver-
sity goals in the tropics will not be met without addressing poverty
ﬁrst (e.g. Adams et al. 2004). Not only will change require better
understanding of feedbacks associated with poverty traps and local
agency, it will also need leaders and the elite (at multiple scales from
local to global) to recognize these interrelationships, and to work
towardsmore deliberative and open processes. For example, balancing
mitigation of climate emissions through Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries
does not mask the need for comprehensive reductions in carbon
emissions by the largest emitters, and may exacerbate poverty,
which is inextricably linked to resource access in many regions
(Angelson et al. 2009). Ignoring that linkage ignores the full cost of
our carbon emissions.
More fully deliberating which ecosystem services should be the
focus of resilience building initiatives in SES can not only help balance
competing conceptualizations of which ecosystem services society
desires to sustain, but can build further beneﬁts toward sustainability.
Indeed, as Levin (2010, p. 13) concludes ‘one of the great challenges in
achieving sustainability will be in understanding the basis for
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cooperation’. Without such an approach, society will struggle to
develop a long-term strategy whereby we collectively live within the
limits of the globe’s ecosystems.
2.6 conclusion
This chapter has highlighted some of the deep political issues and
social implications underlying initiatives to build resilience of
ecosystem services. Before applying the principles discussed in this
book to foster the resilience of ecosystem services, critical attention
should be directed towards understanding the context, contests,
politics and history in which ecosystem services in a particular place
are embedded. In particular, the current set of ecosystem services
provided by a landscape may reﬂect deep asymmetries in which
sectors or groups in society are supported or favoured, and strengthen-
ing the resilience of those ecosystem services may further entrench
these inequalities. In some cases, repercussions from the disenfran-
chised may destabilize a system, while in other cases efforts to reduce
inequity may be well-meaning; however, changes to the existing
ecosystem-service landscape may generate new conﬂicts and trade-
offs. Reﬂecting on these issues can help illuminate who will be
favoured or disadvantaged by choices to build resilience of certain
sets of ecosystem services, and how this may itself inﬂuence the
long-term resilience of these ecosystem services. Norgaard (2010, p.
1226) notes that ‘while economists have been unusually successful at
averting the ethical questions, and in the process supporting those
who currently beneﬁt from the governance structure, this avoidance
has become central to the problems we now have in reaching a global
accord’. The processes we summarize here and elsewhere (Robards et
al. 2011) provide examples of what is being avoided and why. Where
the ﬂow of ecosystem services cannot fulﬁl all social and ecosystem
needs, the feedbacks we discuss will need to be integrated into
governance institutions to ensure that the resilience of ecosystem
services is not incrementally eroded, with long-term repercussions
for human or ecosystem health.
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Given the diversity of potential ecosystem services and govern-
ance arrangements in most SES, the selection of bundles of ecosystem
services is a traditional ‘wicked’ problem in which there can be no
overall deliberative panel or institution to decide which ecosystem
services should be the focus of resilience-building initiatives (Rittl and
Webber 1973). Rather, the ‘chosen’ set of ecosystem services produced
by a social–ecological landscape is an emergent, messy phenomenon
that is the outcome of competition and negotiation between many
different users and sectors of society at different scales, and the
biophysical, economic and institutional constraints of the underlying
SES. Social factors and processes shape and are shaped by the set of
ecosystem services, in what can sometimes be a reinforcing process.
This results in rigidity traps in which systems become highly
connected, self-reinforcing and inﬂexible due to power differentials,
sticky institutional arrangements and othermechanisms constraining
governance changes, including externalization of trade-offs
(Carpenter and Brock 2008). Such traps limit the ability of actors
within the system to reorganize interactions, even if such a reorgani-
zation would beneﬁt the provision of ecosystem services to society
overall (Gunderson and Holling 2002). We have highlighted how
trade-offs associated with ecosystem services can result in such
traps, and are sometimes exacerbated through the scientization of
the political discussion and politicization of scientiﬁc knowledge.
In providing these caveats to the resilience-building enterprise,
we do not suggest that any decision-makers must have fully
contextualized understanding and engage in all of the transaction
costs implied in deliberative democratic practice. What is required is
a measure of awareness and transparency regarding the political
dimensions of potential ecosystem-service choices aswell as potential
futures for which we can build resilience.
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